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a b s t r a c t
Five years passed since, in April, 2000, Kurt Koenigsfest took over as the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer at Banco Solidario
S.A. (BancoSol), in La Paz, Bolivia. BancoSol had become the top Latin American bank specializing in providing
microbusiness services. Since its beginning in 1992, BancoSol achieved excellent results and became an international reference in the microcredit area. In mid-2000, external and internal factors caused its performance to
deteriorate. Kurt and his management team set and implemented a strategy that led the bank to be rated as
the best ﬁnancial institution in the Bolivian ﬁnancial system in 2004. The time had come to plan for the future;
the management team has to establish BancoSol's primary lines of action for the next three years.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Bolivia
1.1. The economic situation
In 1985, Bolivia underwent one of the worst economic crises in its
history. The budget deﬁcit produced severe hyperinﬂation, reaching
levels of up to 11,700% in 1985. Between 1982 and 1986, economic
activity decreased at an average rate of −3.4%, and the public sector deficit was close to 25% of the GDP.
In August 1985, the government established a monetary stabilization program. A series of reforms was applied, which included reducing
the size of the primary state companies and the state itself,
renegotiating or rescheduling external debt, establishing unique
uniform tariffs, simplifying the taxation system, and stabilizing the
exchange rate with full price liberalization. By 1988, inﬂation had
dropped to 20%. From 1993 to 1998, economic growth reached an average annual rate of 4.7%, due in large part to a second wave of reforms
that included changes in the pension system and the market capitalization of the most important public companies. Direct foreign investment
☆ The case was written with the ﬁnancial support from the Microﬁnance Management
Institution as part of its project “MBA programs in microﬁnance” as a way of contributing
to analyzing Latin American administrative and ﬁnancial issues in the microﬁnance sector.
Appendix 1 shows a high reliability analysis of the case. Appendix 2 shows a teaching note
for class discussion; Luis Noel Alfaro (INCAE Business School, Campus Francisco de Sola,
Nicaragua, Luis.Alfaro@incae.edu) is the ﬁrst author of the teaching note.
⁎ Corresponding author at: INCAE Business School, Campus Walter Kissling Gam, 9604050 Alajuela, Costa Rica.
E-mail addresses: caballero.kari@gmail.com (K. Caballero),
mauricio.melgarejo@incae.edu (M. Melgarejo), enrique.ogliastri@incae.edu (E. Ogliastri).

doubled during this period, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit reached 4.7% of the
GDP.
In 1998, the Bolivian economy entered into a deceleration period as
a consequence of various external and internal shocks. The international
ﬁnancial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 and in Brazil 1998 produced a
drop in export product prices and deterioration in the exchange
terms, affecting national production. Several weather problems considerably affected the agricultural sector. The hydrocarbon sector experienced a contraction associated with the end of the gas expert contract
with Argentina and deferral of gas sales to Brazil. Internally, in 1998,
the Dignity Plan was applied to eradicate the surplus coca crops in the
country. This plan exposed the economy's dependence on producing
and marketing coca. A new customs law went into effect in 1999,
which reduced the contraband that was entering the country from
Chile.
In 2003 and 2004, the international context was favorable for Bolivia
due to better prices and lower interest rates in international markets.
However, social and political conﬂicts interrupted the normal economic
activity rate and generated a climate of uncertainty that affected how
the ﬁnancial system functioned and the trust of external investors. During these years, there was a considerable increase in hydrocarbon sector
exports, which primarily resulted from an increase in the volume of natural gas exported to Brazil and a renewal of natural gas exports to
Argentina.
1.2. The political situation
After two decades of military dictatorships, democratic governments began to lead the country in 1992. Since 2003, social
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movements and governance crises have characterized these governments. In February 2003, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, supported by a political coalition that gave him a majority in Congress
and the state security forces (policy and military), created a new
wage tax to reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit that in 2002 had reached 9% of
the GDP. Days later, the tax was canceled because of the public's
irate rejection.
The natural gas export project and the dispute over approving the
surpluses generated by this resource caused a new political crisis. In
August 2003, the government decided to go ahead with a natural gas export project, retaining the existing legislation that only imposed 18% in
taxes and royalties on operating companies. In 2003, an escalation in
protests against this measure spiraled into a strike impelled by the
neighborhood organizations in the city of El Alto. The strike paralyzed
activities in the city and blocked access to the seat of government for
the rest of the country. The government began using the military and
the police to try to put an end to the conﬂict. The confrontations caused
approximately 80 deaths, and 400 people were wounded. The president
was forced to step down, and Vice President Carlos Mesa assumed the
country's presidency.
In a national vote held on July 18, 2004, citizens backed the new
government's policy in relation to natural gas exploitation. In
January 2005, major protests ignited again against a governmental
decree that called for an increase in fuel prices. The protests became
especially serious in Santa Cruz, where the so-called “Pro Santa Cruz
Civic Movement”, made up of business people, union sectors, and
mayors' ofﬁces, announced the immediate election of an assembly
to deﬁne departmental self-governance. The president of this committee proclaimed autonomy and announced that he would call for
elections for a new governor and a referendum that would make
Santa Cruz an autonomous state.
On March 7, 2004, faced with the continuing crisis, Mesa extended an offer to Congress to step down. His resignation was not accepted, and his presidential project was approved to achieve a major
social pact between the main forces and put an end to the imbalance
throughout the country by calling on a constituent assembly to modify the state's political constitution and to strengthen regional autonomy. In May 2004, the Hydrocarbon Law was declared, establishing
an increase in the taxes and royalties paid by foreign oil companies.
The demonstrations returned in force at the end of the month, as
the new law did not satisfy indigenous and mining organizations.
Faced with these obstacles, Mesa resigned and was replaced on
June 9, 2004, by Eduardo Rodriguez, the president of the Supreme
Court of Justice. On December 4, 2005, Bolivia would enter a new
electoral process in which eight candidates aspired for the
presidency.
1.3. The social situation
By 2004, Bolivia was one of the most unequal countries in terms of
the distribution of wealth. The poorest 20% of the population received
4% of the country's income, while the richest 20% of the population received 49.1% (United Nations, 2005). Sixty-three percent of the population lived in urban areas. Poverty affected 63% of the population.
According to unofﬁcial data, approximately 2 million Bolivians lived
abroad. Argentina was the country with the largest Bolivian community
(1.5 million), followed by the United States with 250,000 and Spain
with 150,000. The unemployment rate in Bolivia reached 9.2% in 2005.
The informal sector's contribution to the employed population was
83%. Its contribution to the gross domestic product was approximately
25%.
2. Microﬁnance in Bolivia
As a product of the economic policies applied in Bolivia in the
mid-1980s, numerous contingents of unemployed people joined

the so-called informal sector made up of micro, small, and medium
(MSM) enterprises. This sector did not qualify for formal banking
credit, primarily for three reasons: (1) the lack of collateral; (2) the
non-existence of accounting records, which made it difﬁcult to economically and ﬁnancially evaluate the customer; and (3) problems
of scale because lending very small amounts of money meant very
little proﬁtability due to the cost of each transaction. To confront
this situation in the late 1980s, the ﬁrst non-proﬁt organizations
(NGOs) arose in Bolivia. Its objective was to provide loans to
micro-enterprises, with donations and subsidized funds as its primary funding source.
In mid-1990s, two facts marked the beginning of the process to incorporate regulated ﬁnancial entities that were dedicated to the MSM
sector. In 1992, Banco Solidario S.A. (BancoSol), which had arisen from
the PRODEM NGO, was incorporated as the ﬁrst bank in Latin America
that was dedicated exclusively to the MSM sector. In 1995, the government issued Supreme Decree No. 24,000, which set the norms for creating private ﬁnancial funds (FFPs) and explained how they would
function as specialized ﬁnancial brokers in providing services to
micro- and small borrowers.
Taking advantage of the new norms, several NGOs incorporated
as FFPs (Caja los Andes, FIE, PRODEM, and Ecofuturo). Other FFPs
arose from totally private entrepreneurial initiatives (Fassil and
Fortaleza). The main advantages of becoming a formal entity were
access to larger ﬁnancing sources for institutional ﬁnanciers through
direct public funds deposit instruments and access to information
from the Central Risk Ofﬁces at the Superintendence of Bank and
Financial Entities.
The FFPs kept the institutional mission of the NGOs from which they
arose. Their main objective was to provide greater economic opportunities for low-income earners but in a sustainable and permanent way,
not as a short-lived achievement that depended on subsidies.
Between 1996 and 1998, several ﬁnancial entities began to aggressively promote consumer loans. The credit agents at these institutions,
who received a commission for increasing their portfolios, were mostly
preoccupied with this beneﬁt but did not properly measure how the
loan would be repaid. Since the consumer customer market was limited,
they made contact with micro- and small entrepreneurs and began to
offer them large loans that surpassed normal amounts. Many microentrepreneurs went into excessive debt and, over time, could not pay
off their old or new debts.
The excessive indebtedness of many micro- and small businesses
would have been of no consequence if their income levels had remained
stable. However, as a result of the economic crisis, Bolivia began to suffer
in early 1998, as its income generation capacity decreased signiﬁcantly.
Associations of small borrowers were created in several regions, and
these associations adopted and used pressure tactics (e.g., marches
and blockades) on ﬁnancial entities and government ofﬁces. The
microﬁnance institutions held meetings with these associations and
their legal advisors to clarify these situations and ask for lists of
consumers who were in arrears to negotiate the most appropriate
solution.
In early 1999, the Superintendence issued new regulations to limit
excessive indebtedness. A key component in these regulations was
that debt should be limited to 25% of salaried workers' veriﬁable incomes. Between 1999 and 2000, the more important consumer credit
entities stopped ﬁnancing micro-entrepreneurs.
Although Bolivia's political and economic crisis continued in subsequent years, the ﬁnancial sector that specialized in microﬁnance
had been able to consolidate its market position. The credit portfolios
of these institutions showed major growth in 2002, 2003 and 2004,
as did the number of customers served and their service coverage.
Several of these institutions had been able to attain delinquent loan
rates that were lower compared with those of the formal banking
system, which was accompanied by greater solvency and proﬁts
(see Table 1).
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Table 1
Customers and branch number evolution.
1998
Urban customers
206,869
BancoSol and FFP
165,872
Financial ONG
40,997
Rural customers
144,661
BancoSol and FFP
5121
Financial ONG
139,540
Total
351,530
Urban branches
103
BancoSol and FFP
73
Financial ONG
30
Rural branches
124
BancoSol and FFP
9
Financial ONG
115
Total
227
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras y Finrural

1999

2000

2001

2002

259,258
217,982
41,276
159,270
6364
152,906
418,528
162
98
64
129
8
121
291

206,984
165,418
41,566
145,298
34,196
111,102
352,282
157
92
65
135
48
87
292

212,010
165,795
46,215
130,780
29,178
101,602
342,790
148
92
56
142
47
95
290

198,281
144,970
53,311
137,049
27,822
109,227
335,330
183
110
73
158
44
114
341

Financial system indicators of delinquency, solvency and proﬁtability
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Portfolio in arrears/gross portfolio
FFP
6.35%
Banking system (1)
6.69%
BancoSol
7.02%

9.14%
11.55%
12.33%

12.13%
16.25%
14.65%

7.20%
17.94%
9.46%

4.83%
17.14%
6.82%

3.06%
14.50%
4.21%

Reserve created/portfolio in arrears
FFP
86.01%
Banking system (1)
54.83%
BancoSol
100.02%

85.27%
54.09%
78.62%

108.71%
56.11%
72.48%

132.84%
64.38%
91.2%

168.22%
75.04%
104.3%

159.61%
85.51%
119.3%

3.8%
−9.60%
3.95%

1.0%
−4.26%
0.46%

4.0%
0.72%
1.71%

12.7%
2.83%
13.3%

15.8%
−1.18%
20.9%

Return on equity
FFP
Financial system (1)
BancoSol

N.A.
8.35%
9.00%

Total public deposits (thousands of US $)
FFP and BancoSol
84,836
Financial system (1)
3,464,981

116,289
3,387,030

142,572
3,123,832

167,426
2,718,262

213,778
2,612,495

270,399
2,451,909

(1) Not including BancoSol.
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras.

2.1. Credit methodologies
The primary methodologies used in relation to the informal sector
were savings and loan associations, individual credit, and community
banks. The primary characteristic of solidarity groups is their use of an
intangible guarantee. This type of guarantee means that all group members (3 to 6 people) commit to being liable for any possible default on
payment by one of its members. The solidarity group as a whole becomes the borrower. The credit granted is sequential, as the group starts
receiving small amounts of money that grows as a function of meeting
the group's obligations. Ranging from personal to mortgage loans, individual loans use a variety of guarantees, making it possible for customers to create their own business plans in line with the activity
performed.
A community bank is a group of people who are responsible for
managing and returning granted funds. The Executive Institution
(which grants the loan) organizes community associations. Each community bank appoints a credit committee to handle an external account,
which is made up of funds granted by the Institution, and an internal account with bank members' funds. The internal account funds are generated from two sources. The ﬁrst source consists of the savings of
community bank members, which is required to be able to access credit.
These savings are deposited into a bank account in the ﬁnancial system
in the community bank's name. The second source consists of interest
that is generated on the external account during the loan cycle (approximately two months). Once the Executive Institution funds are received,
they are circulated permanently among the community bank borrowers, as they make weekly payments to principal and interest.

These funds are again loaned to customers, thus making it possible to
capitalize the external account.
2.2. Primary ﬁnancial institutions
In addition to BancoSol, the primary regulated microﬁnance
institutions in Bolivia are Banco Los Andes ProCredit, FIE FPP and
PRODEM FPP.
In 1995, Caja Los Andes was the ﬁrst PFF created in Bolivia. It began
operations in July 1995, based on the ProCredit NGO credit portfolio,
activities, and technology. Its primary objective was to contribute to
the economic and social development of lower-income earners by providing ﬁnancial services that supported MSM enterprises and improved
families' quality of life. In January 2005, Caja Los Andes began operating
as Banco Los Andes ProCredit and had equity of approximately US $15
million. The bank was part of the Grupo ProCredit, a ﬁnancial institution
network with 18 members in countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America
and Africa. As of mid-2005, the bank had various credit products, including micro-enterprise loans from US $50, micro-enterprise lines of credit
for working capital up to US $12,000, loans to small and medium enterprises up to US $750,000, housing loans, and loans backed by security
instruments. Likewise, it offered non-credit services, such as national
drafts and transfers, public utility and service payments, and debit
cards. It had 37 branches spread across La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba,
Tarija, Sucre, Potosi, Trinidad, and six intermediary cities. Close to 800
people worked at the bank.
The Private Financial Fund for Promoting Economic Initiatives (FIE
FFP) arose with the support of the FIE NGO, which belonged to the
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Swiss Agency for Aid and Development (COSUDE) and Bolivian investors. In 1998, it obtained a license to operate as a Private Financial
Fund. In late 2004, it provided services to MSM enterprises through 33
ofﬁces in La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Potosi, Tarija, Sucre, Oruro,
and three intermediary cities. The main FIE FFP products were lines of
credit for micro-entrepreneurs, consumer loans, housing loans, and
small and micro entrepreneur loans. The average portfolio term was approximately 16 months. The bank lending rates ranged between 18%
and 30%, depending on the amount, guarantee, and terms. The
institution's primary funding sources were public and commercial
banking obligations.
The Foundation for the Promotion and Development Microenterprise (PRODEM) FFP began operations as a Private Financial Fund in
mid-1999. It had been created based on the 13 years of experience of
PRODEM, whose mission at that time had been to provide ﬁnancial support to nine Bolivian departments through 75 branches (20 located in
urban areas and 47 in rural areas). The primary credit product was
targeted at MSM enterprises and professionals who worked on their
own. The loans were for up to US $7000, with terms of up to two
years for working capital and up to three years for capital investment.
3. BancoSol
In 1984, ACCION International, an NGO with ofﬁces in the United
States and operations throughout Latin America, recruited a group of inﬂuential Bolivians to head the creation of a micro-enterprise development program. As a result, in 1986, ACCION International created
PRODEM as a co-investing foundation among members of the Bolivian
entrepreneurial community, who provided the start-up capital and
leadership, and ACCION, which provided the program with technology
and credit methodology. Initially, PRODEM had 15 employees at its
headquarters in La Paz.
PRODEM offered loans to solidarity groups. Payable weekly, the initial loans could be for up to $50 at a 2.5% monthly interest on loans in
dollars (and a 4% monthly interest on loans in bolivianos) for a term
of two months. When loans were paid off, the subsequent limits for dollar amounts and loan duration increased.
By 1991, the foundation was covering its costs, but growth was becoming increasingly difﬁcult. As a donor-ﬁnanced not-for-proﬁt organization, PRODEM could not legally accept deposits or take out loans in
the monetary market, which left it with few funding sources: donor
contributions, loans subsidized by development organizations, and
portfolio earnings. The loan demand was growing at a rate of 50% and
substantially exceeded the donor organizations' capacities to ﬁnance
these loans. PRODEM was forced to reduce its loans.
To combat this ﬁnancial challenge, the PRODEM Board of Directors
proposed using a portion of the capital to launch a for-proﬁt commercial
bank. The bank would avoid the donor ﬁnancing bottleneck by raising
foreign investor capital, accepting deposits, and taking out loans in the
open market. After lengthy discussions between PRODEM's management, Board of Directors, and donors (e.g., USAID, its most important
donor) in late 1991, PRODEM decided to establish BancoSol through
the following series of transactions:
• PRODEM transferred $1.4 million of its credit portfolio and six of its
most developed branches to BancoSol in exchange for 41% of the
new bank's capital position.
• BancoSol put together capital from foreign investor groups, which included the Inter-American Investment Corporation (ICC, with 24%
share) as the primary investor and various international NGOs
(e.g., ACCION, Calmeadow, FUNDES, the Rockefeller Foundation, and
SIDI). Several Bolivian business leaders and their companies acquired
the remaining shares.
• Approximately half of the PRODEM staff went to BancoSol. During the
transition, PRODEM provided ofﬁce space, technical training, and information technology support.

On February 10, 1992, BancoSol ofﬁcially opened its doors to the
public in La Paz.

3.1. BancoSol, 1992–2000
In the beginning, the bank only offered three products: solidarity
(joint) loans, term deposits, and on-demand deposits. The products
were design to be simple, to facilitate quick decisions, and to be
sufﬁciently ﬂexible to grow with customer needs.
The joint loans were loans extended to groups of three to six
borrowers. The joint guarantee encouraged customers to partner with
others who had the same credit capacity, which would make it possible
for credit advisors to avoid the investigation process and to obtain real
guarantees. The intent was to create homogenous groups in terms to
the size of each business; the total amount to be disbursed could thus
be distributed equitably among group members.
Initial loans were offered for US $50 to US $100 per customer for a
two-month term. When this loan was paid off, the subsequent loan
amount and term could be increased to a maximum of US $5000 per
solidary group for a three-year term. The process began by identifying
borrowers. The bank employees did broad ﬁeld work, investigating
local neighborhoods, and got to know their potential customers. The
loan documentation was minimal, but monitoring was intense and
direct because credit advisors met weekly with each solidarity group.
Payments were made on Monday, and the bank's information system
identiﬁed any late payments that same night. On Tuesdays, the groups
that had not paid were visited to ﬁnd out when they would make
their payments.
Two-thirds of the credit advisors were women, and most held university degrees in social science. The BancoSol salary structure was on
a par with NGOs and other organizations in the development ﬁeld.
Commercial bank salaries were comparable to BancoSol salaries, but incentive payments caused commercial banking credit advisors to receive
higher total compensation.
In 1992, the average loan size at BancoSol was US $326, with a 35%
interest rate (60% of the loans were in bolivianos). At other commercial
banks, the minimum loan was US $5000; the average loan was greater
than US $10,000; and the interest rate was 15% on loans in dollars
(and 30% on loans in bolivianos).
BancoSol concentrated on the informal urban sector. The bank acted
quickly to establish branches in the largest cities in Bolivia, opening 12
branches in 1993, 9 in 1994, and 3 in 1995. Over time, regional ofﬁces
were opened in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Sucre. The National
Bank Ofﬁce organizational structure was made up of a general management department and four functional management departments. The
bank gained immediate acceptance in the market and great ﬁnancial
success and was the international reference point for micro-enterprise
ﬁnancing. The credit portfolio grew at compounded rates of close to
40% during the 1992–1997 period.
In the mid-1990s, some of the bank's most successful customers
began to leave microﬁnance institutions. Follow-up interviews held
with the customers revealed that as the companies and customers'
credit needs grew, they encountered various kinds of frustrations at
BancoSol (e.g., hitting the joint loan limit of US $5000). Approximately
30% indicated that they left due to problems in their solidarity groups.
As a response, an individual loan product was introduced in July 1999
that was available to the bank's best customers. The credit limit was
set at US $30,000 with a term of up to ﬁve years.
In 1997, founding shareholder ICC, which an investor with an explicit social purpose, reached the ﬁve-year limit on its investment period, so
it decided to put its bank shares up for sale. The same year, PRODEM
decided to apply for a FFP license, thus becoming a direct BancoSol
competitor, so it had to liquidate its shareholder position. ACCION believed that BancoSol was its most successful example and was willing
to increase its investment.
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ACCION, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), and
various local entrepreneurs acquired the offered shares. PRODEM reduced its shares from 35% to 20% and resigned from its position on the
Board of Directors.
In 1999 and 2000, the BancoSol performance deteriorated, alongside
the lackluster performance in the rest of the ﬁnancial sector. In late
1999, individual loans made up 31% of the bank's portfolio, with a delinquency rate of just 2.9%. The solidarity loans represented 69% of the
loans, with a delinquency rate of 9%.
The Board of Directors believed that the bank was in crisis. The
bank's ﬁnancial performance was deteriorating, its distinctive product
(i.e., the solidarity loan) was under pressure, and the Board of Directors
and management were divided on how to address the situation.
Attracted by the excellent returns, new shareholders supported the
idea of climbing in the market by concentrating on the small and medium segments. Headed by ACCION and ProFund, another group advocated for improving the relationship with the microbusiness segment by
introducing new products that were still missing in the informal sector.
A group led by activists, who remained in the middle management departments, was in favor of keeping the original PRODEM formula; the
Board of Directors did not support this option.
After several months of discussion, the Board of Directors proceeded
with replacing the bank's upper management. In April 2000, it hired
Kurt Koenigsfest as CEO and asked him to prepare a strategy to improve
BancoSol's performance.
When the new management group began to analyze the BancoSol
situation in mid-2000s, several problems came to light. The solidarity
loan had been distorted. Several loans had real guarantees; the amounts
granted within a group varied signiﬁcantly; and a large number of these
loans were being used for purposes that were not productive
(e.g., purchasing vehicles). In addition, a large portion of the individual
loans ﬁnanced since 1999 had repayment problems, as the CEO revealed: “Most of our credit advisors did not have adequate knowledge
to evaluate the customer's individual payment capacity. Between July
1999 and June 2000, the portfolio had more problems than BancoSol
had had in all its history.”
The new management found that each regional ofﬁce was functioning as an independent bank. Each regional manager had total freedom in
terms of purchases, hiring staff, and services. Accounting was totally
decentralized, and there was no uniform rate schedule; each regional
manager could set bank borrowing and lending rates at will. The bank
culture was fairly informal, according to the CEO: “There were no staff
vacation records, and the staff that worked more than 10 hours one
day could take half of the next day off. The bank employees thought
that the bonanza that had existed at BancoSol would never stop,
which made them very conformist. They thought that the bank had
reached the peak in the microﬁnance area.”
The information system was obsolete and disproportionate. As
needs came up in the system, patches were programmed as temporary
solutions.
A chief ofﬁcer of the BancoSol management team revealed the following: “The image that people had of BancoSol was of a bank that
gave loans. We were only using 10% of our bank license, and the bank
had stagnated with the products it had started with.”
3.2. BancoSol, September 2000–2005
In September 2000, the shareholders, directors, and new management team participated in a meeting in which they analyzed the main
problems that the management had discovered. They jointly created a
new mission for BancoSol (see Fig. 1). However, internal discussions
continued about the path that the bank should follow.
In May 2001, the general shareholders' meeting assigned an independent person to be the President of the Board. The new President of
the Board identiﬁed the problems BancoSol faced: “The three main challenges we had when I took charge of the Board of Directors were
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governance problems affecting the bank, different visions about the
bank's future, and a lack of monitoring in the administration.” The CEO
was convinced that the proﬁtability goal could be reached by improving
the bank's relationship with the microbusiness segment, so he
proceeded to prepare a strategic plan for the 2001–2005 period. He explained the plan's primary goals: “The main directives of the strategic
plan that we brought up with the Board of Directors were to develop
new products and services, improve portfolio quality, optimize and
standardize the operating departments, and achieve cost efﬁciency.”
After several meetings, the Board of Directors decided to support the
new strategy in July 2001. They would remain in the microbusiness
niche, making long-term solvency a priority by sacriﬁcing short-term
proﬁtability.
While a better monitoring and tracking tool was being researched,
the Board decided to use the CAMEL methodology to evaluate bank
functioning on a monthly basis. CAMEL is a ﬁnancial evaluation system
that analyzes a set of indicators grouped in ﬁve areas: Equity Sufﬁciency,
Asset Quality, Administration, Results, and Liquidity. The administration
had to present a report on how these indicators were changing, comparing BancoSol performance with that of the institutions that were considered its main competitors: Caja Los Andes, FIE and PRODEM. In
September 2000, several changes began to take place in all of the bank's
functional departments.
3.2.1. Commercial department
According to the CEO, “One of the ﬁrst tasks [BancoSol] carried out
was to open up the bank product portfolio. For example, [the bank]
found that micro-entrepreneurs needed loans to remodel their homes.
Between the end of 2000 and 2001, [BancoSol] went from two to
seven products that targeted microcredit, consumption, housing, and
commerce”. The seven products were: i) Sol Individual, loans targeting
individuals, who own an economic unit so they can generate sufﬁcient
cash ﬂow to amortize the loan and enter the microcredit market;
ii) Solidario, join loans granted to micro entrepreneurs with their own
business in groups of 3 or 4, with a join guarantee, shared by all and indivisible; iii) Sol Vivienda, mortgage loans for housing, targeting purchasing, constructing, improving and/or legalizing housing; iv) Sol
Efectivo, loans for salaried workers; v) Sol Vehiculo, auto loans for individuals; vi) Solicita, commercial loans targeting small and medium enterprises for their commercial, production or services business; and
vii) Sol de Oro, loans backed by jewels or gold. For savings products,
the savings account was re-launched, and a new ﬁxed-term deposit
was launched, with interest to be paid monthly.
A series of non-credit services was developed, focusing on national
and international remittances and transfers, public utility and service
payments, tax collection, the provision of guarantee titles, debit cards
and the installation of an automatic teller network. BancoSol signed an
agreement with Banco Velox (2001) and Banco Columbia (2002) of
Argentina to implement a service to send drafts and money transfers between Argentina and Bolivia. It also signed agreements with Transfer
Exact (2002) and CIAXA (2004) to implement transfers between Spain
and Bolivia. In 2004, it began activities with two remittance agencies
in the US.
Due to product and service portfolio diversiﬁcation, in early 2001,
the bank saw the need to redesign its branches, implementing customer
service platforms to facilitate opening accounts and providing complete
information about the bank's services.
From the beginning, commercial management opted for mass
communication media (e.g., radio and television) to transmit different
advertising campaigns that circulated the new products and services offered by the bank. It also launched an institutional campaign that sought
to change the bank's image from a single-product bank to a diversiﬁed
bank, which was a revolutionary concept, as nobody in the sector believed that extensive advertising would have any effect on microentrepreneurs. “The campaign got the desired results,” according to
the national Commercial Manager.
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BancoSol Vision, Mission and Values
Mission We are the leading
bank, solvent,
efficient, and
profitable, supporting
micro and small
enterprises since 1992,
allowing easy, quick
access to high-quality
integral financial
services.
Vision

We are the top bank in providing
integral financial services within
the reach of people, micro
entrepreneurs and business
initiatives in Bolivia’s majority
sectors with whom we take on a
high degree of commitment.

We are the bank that
provides the chance to have a
better future to lower income
segments through access to
high-quality integral
financial services.

BancoSol will be the number one
microfinance institution in
portfolio volume and number of
customers in each of the regions it
operates. Its risk profile will be
less than its direct competition’s,
with stable loan portfolio. The
liability structure will be
optimized through external,
internal, and public funds deposit,
maintaining appropriate
asset/liability management.
We will be the most profitable
institution with the lowest
operating expense against assets
in the mico-finance system,
supported by appropriate use of
information technology. Our
human resources will have the
appropriate professional profiles
and will have a high degree of
motivation and commitment to
the bank and the customer. The
bank will provide incentives and
develop a culture oriented toward
performance and competitiveness.

Be an innovative
microfinance leader and a
reference point
internationally and
nationally, favoring
development, progress, and
quality of life for low income
people.

Values

Service, Integrity,
Reciprocity, Responsibility,
Coherence, Commitment.
Fig. 1. BancoSol Vision, mission and values.

3.2.1.1. Loans. The Chief Credit Ofﬁcer indicated that “[o]one of the ﬁrst
measures taken in this department was to reclassify the loans portfolio
and call each loan by its real name.” By the end of 2000, the solidarity
loan only represented 34% of the total.
In January 2001, the new Chief Credit Ofﬁcer, a position created to
improve portfolio quality, began making changes in the credit policy
guidelines. The autonomy margins for approving loans were modiﬁed that year. For example, the brand managers were authorized to
approve loans with real guarantees for up to US $8000 and without
real guarantees for up to US $6000. Automatic and manual internal
controls were also implemented to facilitate closer monitoring of
how the loaned funds were used and how they were performing.
One of the credit department's greatest achievements was controlling the individual loan portfolio deterioration that occurred between 1998 and 2000. It had been necessary to penalize almost US
$14 million as part of the recovery strategy. This effort was achieved
in the same commercial line of business without any supporting
loans or shareholder capitalization.
In 2002, a new version of the credit policy manual was implemented
nationally to standardize the loan process and to introduce new risk
evaluation tools. The bank also developed a new credit scoring tool
that year, which was oriented toward new customer selection and old
customer segmentation processes. Using historical information and statistical techniques, the new system made it possible to evaluate the

potential risk in granting loans. The ﬁnal result was a score that enabled
the rating of credit applications in terms of the likelihood of the borrower defaulting on the loan.
In 2003, additional improvements were made to the credit manual.
A new mechanism was implemented to evaluate loans by the amount
ranges, creating instruments to evaluate loans of less than US $1000,
loans between US $1000 and US $6000, and loans of more than US
$6000. This mechanism also created analysis tools for SME loans.
The changes in credit policy and product diversiﬁcation led to
changes in the credit advisor proﬁle. The new credit advisor had to
have a university degree in the areas of management, economics, commercial engineering, or ﬁnance, with relevant experience in the area for
at least one year. In addition, an advisor had to have certain attributes
(e.g., sociability, entrepreneurialism, a personable demeanor) and
have a talent for winning over customers. In 2004, the Credit Department was created to ensure compliance with the bank's credit policy,
standardize credit processes and train credit managers and advisors in
the ﬁeld. The bank created the Methodology Process Department to
check and verify that the technology tools and credit processes were
properly applied in the ﬁeld.
Largely due to credit policy changes and the new credit risk analysis
tool, BancoSol reduced its delinquent portfolio from 12.33% in 2000 to
4.21% in 2004. In addition to efforts to improve portfolio quality, the
bank increased reserve coverage in 2004.
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3.2.2.1. Administration and human resources. In 2001, the administration
was faced with the challenge of reducing cost and standardizing the
bank's administrative process. According to the Chief Administrative Ofﬁcer, “To reduce costs, limits were established for the regional ofﬁces'
expense autonomy—any expense above US $300 had to be authorized
by the Chief Operating and Financial Ofﬁcer and the CEO.” Payments
for manager cellular phones were also limited to 130 bolivianos (less
than US $20) per month.
Each of the institution's expense items was analyzed. The Chief
Operating and Financial Ofﬁcer explained: “For example, we found that
37 branches were leased by the bank and that close to 30 were leased
at prices above the market. They were thus renegotiated with the property owners, and the expense for this item was reduced by 30%.”
Due to the divergence among regional processes, the customer
service schedule, functions, roles, reporting structures, responsibilities,
accounting processes, and uniform charts of account applications were
standardized.
As part of the strategy, it was necessary to add new functional departments and reinforce the existing ones. For example, in January
2001, BancoSol created two new positions: a new Chief Credit Ofﬁcer
and a Deputy Chief of Credit Risk.
All changes made in these years caused deterioration in the operational climate, so the new CEO organized a series of workshops at all regional ofﬁces to communicate the bank's new strategy and values. These
high-impact training workshops were vivid and dynamic because they
did not follow the typical formal academic routine, using low and high
ropes courses and leadership and teamwork workshops.

3.2.2. Information systems
According to the Chief Systems Ofﬁcer, BancoSol found itself “in possession of obsolete, totally decentralized equipment and systems, so the
ﬁrst job in the department was to centralize all the information system
processes in 2002.” Two latest-generation servers were installed, making it possible to do away with the regional servers. The bandwidth
was extended for data and communication ﬂow, making it possible to
consolidate and connect all online operations nationally. The Cooperative Open Banking Information System (COBIS) asset and liability software was updated to the latest version on the market.
In 2004, the operating and direct customer contact departments
were modernized and standardized. More than 350 leading-edge personal computers were acquired to beneﬁt the operations departments,
credit advisors, service platforms, and the branch teller area. The Chief
Systems Ofﬁcer reﬂected on these technological updates: “Since 2004,
the technology department developed several projects to be able to
provide products and services of more value to our customers. We
developed customer selection and segmentation scoring for our credit
advisors and also provided them with portable electronic tools to facilitate promoting products and collecting and evaluating customer information. We also worked on improving connectivity with various
institutions abroad to become a remittance headquarters for a large
part of the national ﬁnancial system. During all these years, we had to
work on putting patches on the main software because the bank's position would not allow for a large-scale investment in this area. At the end
of 2002, we began working on a general replacement for the bank's information technology system. This project will be ﬁnished in 2006.”

Table 2
BancoSol performance indicators.
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Capital
Equity (millions of US $)
Equity/assets
Reserves/overdue 1 day or more
Reserves/overdue N30 days
Overdue/equity

14.3
14.5%
100.0%
127.9%
40.2%

14.6
15.9%
78.6%
101.1%
65.7%

14.5
14.8%
72.5%
83.8%
81.7%

14.8
14.2%
91.2%
104.6%
51.7%

16.8
14.7%
104.3%
120.0%
37.0%

18.6
13.5%
119.3%
136.2%
24.5%

Assets
Branches (#)*
Employees (#)
Assets (millions of US $)
Portfolio (millions of US $)
Portfolio growth
Overdue 1 day or more/portfolio
Overdue 30 days or more/portfolio
Fixed assets (millions of US $)

43
629
99.2
82.3
11.1%
7.0%
5.9%
6.8

37
554
91.9
77.8
−5.4%
12.3%
9.6%
6.4

35
506
98.9
81.1
4.3%
14.7%
12.7%
5.6

34
503
104.3
80.9
−0.3%
9.5%
8.2%
5.4

36
581
114.3
91.2
12.7%
6.8%
5.9%
5.6

34
592
138.2
108.6
19.1%
4.2%
3.7%
6.2

33.9%
9.6%
4.6%
18.2%
13.9%

30.1%
9.0%
5.0%
15.4%
12.8%

26.8%
7.2%
5.6%
14.8%
12.5%

23.9%
5.5%
6.4%
12.4%
10.0%

22.8%
5.1%
2.6%
14.0%
11.1%

22.8%
5.0%
1.7%
13.6%
10.9%

Administration
Financial income/average portfolio
Financial expenses/average portfolio
Bad debt expenses/average portfolio
Administrative expenses/average portfolio
Administrative expenses/average assets
Productivity
Number of credit advisors
Customers per credit advisor
Number of loans
Portfolio (millions of US $)
Income
Service fees (millions of US $)
Net income (millions of US $)
Liquidity
Total public deposits (millions US $)
Total number of accounts (savings + ﬁxed term)
Total deposit growth
Available + temporary investments/assets

242
302
30,199
122.5

195
313
35,816
80.8

159
338
39,269
64.4

192
265
36,941
64.8

217
261
39,968
74.1

218
304
46,221
49.8

0.4
1.27

0.6
0.55

0.9
0.06

0.9
0.25

1.0
2.23

1.2
3.89

54.8
30,050
1.1%
12.0%

54.9
32,728
0.2%
11.2%

61
46,665
11.1%
14.6%

61.9
53,341
1.5%
17.2%

69.7
53,600
12.5%
13.3%

80.8
61,823
15.9%
16.4%

Source: BancoSol.

Please cite this article as: Caballero, K., et al., Banco Solidario S.A.: The recovery strategy, 2000–2004, Journal of Business Research (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.03.010

8

K. Caballero et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

Table 3
CAMEL analysis: BancoSol vs. competition.

Indices
Capital
(Net overdue portfolio)/equity
(Net overdue portfolio + marketable
goods)/equity
Reserve/equity
(Assets + contingency)/equity
Asset
Net overdue portfolio/gross portfolio
(Net overdue portfolio + marketable
goods)/gross portfolio
Total reserve/gross portfolio
Total reserve/overdue portfolio

2000

2003

BancoSol LOS
PRODEM FIE
ANDES

BancoSol LOS
ANDES

2004

−2.08%
8.75%

18.67%
18.67%

6.70%
6.80%

−0.02%
−0.02%

−1.60%
6.80%

11.40% 15.40%
15.10% 15.60%

47.16%
7.1

55.11%
10.4

30.30%
8.6

53.33%
7.4

38.60%
6.8

22.40% 23.30%
8.5
11.0

−0.38%
1.60%

2.02%
2.02%

1.00%
1.00%

0.00%
0.00%

−0.30%
1.30%

8.63%
104.62%

5.95%
74.69%

4.40%
82.00%

1.60%
2.20%

7.53%
7.10%
100.03% 104.30%

PRODEM FIE

1.80%
1.80%

3.20%
2.70%
66.20% 60.10%

BancoSol LOS
ANDES

PRODEM FIE

−2.20%
−2.20%

−8.00%
−3.40%

−9.50%
−7.50%

−9.20%
−9.10%

−28.50%
−28.50%

29.30%
7.3

32.50%
7.5

33.10%
9.4

39.20%
12.7

50.10%
8.1

−0.30%
−0.30%

−1.40%
−0.60%

−1.20%
−1.00%

−0.90%
−0.90%

−4.00%
−4.00%

4.30%
3.90%
140.00% 130.70%

6.90%
232.40%

4.50%
5.60%
108.10% 132.40%

Administration
Administrative expenses/
(assets + contingencies)
Administrative expenses/total expenses

9.42%

10.98%

11.80%

9.50%

11.00%

10.10% 11.30%

9.90%

9.90%

10.90%

12.70%

10.70%

29.24%

39.36%

33.60%

20.68%

58.60%

60.90% 52.20%

57.60%

54.70%

59.40%

58.40%

54.60%

Earnings
Net income/ﬁnancial income
Financial income/(assets + contingencies)
Net income/(assets + contingencies)
Net income/equity
Other net operating income/ﬁnancial income

1.32%
18.14%
0.24%
1.71%
4.65%

7.38%
19.65%
1.45%
15.13%
4.34%

4.80%
18.70%
0.90%
7.80%
8.40%

12.25%
19.37%
2.37%
17.63%
4.47%

11.60%
18.00%
2.10%
13.30%
6.50%

11.00%
6.70%
16.50% 15.40%
1.80%
1.00%
15.50% 11.40%
3.00% 11.50%

15.30%
18.10%
2.80%
20.30%
7.20%

17.20%
18.20%
3.20%
20.90%
6.50%

8.50%
17.00%
1.50%
12.40%
4.10%

8.50%
18.20%
1.60%
18.60%
12.70%

15.80%
20.20%
3.20%
24.70%
7.60%

99.29%

62.60%

164.36%

73.40%

116.70% 56.20%

96.30% 147.90%

181.90%

99.70%

116.40%

6.62%
9.45%

7.20%
12.10%

4.94%
8.76%

4.90%
15.50%

7.70%
7.10%
13.70% 12.90%

7.90%
14.30%

9.30%
13.80%

14.60%
12.60%

Liquidity
(Cash + temporary investment)/short-term
119.86%
liability
Cash + cash equivalents/public liability
9.18%
(Cash + temporary investment)/total liability
20.07%

11.80%
13.10%

8.40%
19.00%

Strategic Map

Financial

To increase the value
of the Bank

To keep ideal levels
of solvency

To Increase the profitability

To increase
Financial income

To increase income for
other operative services

To optimize the maturity
match, currency match
and interes rate match

To optimize the
structure of funds

Customer

To increase clients in current and
new marketplaces

Process

To improve the
productiveness
administrative efficiency

To keep ideal levels
of quality of portfolio

To retain clients

To increase the satisfaction and preference of the client

To show image of “Total Banking”
specializing in Microfinance
sponsability

Learning and
Growth

To keep ideal
levels

To optimize and to standardize
the processes and systems
of control

To offer excellent
Service to the client

To give agile and
opportune response

To reach the simplicity in
the delivery of our
Products / services

To promote and to innovate the
Technological resources
and of information

To offer prices and equitable
and competitive conditions

To innovate products and financial
services with competitive and
Comparative advantages

Motivated, Prepared and Compromised Personnel with
our vision, mission and values
To select qualified
personnel
and with the suitable

To raise the competences and
to promote the development
of our personnel

To improve the labor
climate
promoting the

To have a system of
compensations and incentives
based on the performance

Fig. 2. Strategic map.
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The Human Resources Department put together a series of training
sessions each year about customer service quality, ﬁnancial analysis,
scoring, products and services, credit risk analysis, the bank's credit processes, and the new version of the credit policy. The CEO said that
BancoSol “started training all staff members who wanted to continue
with (the bank) so that they could perform their duties in line with
the changes.”
3.2.2.2. Finance and control. As for liquidity indices, BancoSol kept liquidity levels above the national banking system average in the latter years.
The decision to maintain these levels was in response to the strategy
that was designed to help the bank be prepared in case of any contingency and potentially provide an immediate response to customers
who were withdrawing their funds.
As the CFO explaining, “People thought that micro-entrepreneur did
not save. Nevertheless, in the periods of crisis, they brought their money
to the bank as a means of protection, while the rest of the banking system showed a major fund outﬂow.” As part of its strategy, the bank reduced its ﬁnancial costs by changing the funding structure and reached
70% in public deposits in savings and term accounts in 2004. The improvements in the operating, commercial and credit departments bore
fruit. Proﬁts for 2003 reached US $2.23 million (see Table 2) and had a
return on equity of 13.3% higher than Caja Los Andes and PRODEM
(see Table 3).
In early 2004, the Board of Directors decided to use the Balance Score
Card as a monitoring and tracking tool. Along with the administration, the
directors proceeded to prepare a strategic map, suggesting that objectives

and indicators be evaluated from the perspective of learning, growth, internal, customer, and ﬁnancial considerations (see Figs. 2 and 3).

3.2.3. Social responsibility
In 2004, BancoSol shareholders and top management decided to
complement the ﬁnancial results with social impact indicators. The following elements were introduced into the institutional culture:
i) endure value in the products and services, manifested by satisfaction
and quality, ii) maintain active participation in the community served
throughout the country, iii) participate actively in caring for the environment and creating an ecological awareness among our customers
and employees, and iv) facilitate and empower the development of all
BancoSol's employees, with equal opportunities and conditions for all.
As part of its social responsibility initiatives, the bank promoted professional development of its employees. For example, in 2004, 7 employees
received a post-graduate degree, 5 employees ﬁnished their graduate
degree, and three ﬁnished their Master's degree.
With ACCION's technical support, the bank was able to develop a report model called the Social Score Card. The purpose of the instrument
was to monitor progress for poor customers and consisted in measuring
customer poverty through the income and expense variables for
customers' homes. The information was obtained during the credit evaluation process for each customer (see Table 4). In addition in mid-2004,
the bank evaluated more than 9000 customers who, in January 2000,
applied for microcredit. The results showed that 41% of these customers
improved their income and 28% maintained it. For the future, the bank's

Profit and Loss indicators
Objective
Financial Perspective

Indicator

Increase Profits
Maintain optimum solvency levels
Maintain optimum liquidity levels
Increase income from other operating services
Increase financial income
Optimize matching terms, currencies, and rates
Optimize funding structure
Improve productivity and administrative efficiency
Maintain optimum portfolio quality levels
Customer Perspective
Increase customers at current and new locations
Keep customers
Show the image of Total Banking specialized in micro
finances and having social responsibility
Provide excellent customer service
Provide efficient, quick, and timely response
Offer equitable, competitive prices and conditions

9

Net income / Average equity (ROE)
Net overdue portfolio / equity
Available funds / public liabilities
Other net operating income / financial income
Income per portfolio / average gross portfolio
Average match weighted by term
Financial expenses / deposits with average cost
Administrative expenses / average gross portfolio
Net overdue portfolio / gross portfolio
Market share
Customer desertion index
Top of mind (with all mentions)
Ratio of perception about service in the teller area
Number of days until disbursement for loans for less
than US$ 1,000
Ratio of perception about interest rate in relation to
value received

Internal perspective
Optimize and standardize internal processes
Number of optimized processes
Attain unaffectedness and simplicity in delivering our
Number of exclusive customers / total customer
products and services
Empower and innovate technological information
resources
Bank automation level
Innovate financial products and services with comparative Number of new products or services / total products
and competitive advantages
and services
Learning and Growth Perspective
Number of staff members with degrees/ number of
Select qualified personnel with the appropriate profile
employees
Elevate competences and promote staff development
Average training time per employee
Improve the work climate, promoting communication and
teamwork
Turnover index
Have a performance-based compensation system and
Number of staff members under the compensation
incentives
floor
Source: BancoSol
Fig. 3. Proﬁt and loss indicators.
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Table 4
BancoSol social score card.
Source: BancoSol.
Statistics by poverty
level

% of
customers

% of portfolio
balance

% new
customers

Average monthly home income
(in US $)

Average loan amount
(in US $)

% portfolio at risk
(overdue N30 days)

%
savers

Level 1
Poor customersa
Level 2
Vulnerable customersb
Level 3
Not poorc

54.6%

50.3%

57.6%

336.69

3.411

3.5%

20.2%

16.1%

16.7%

16.0%

455.68

3.928

2.9%

25.5%

29.3%

33.0%

26.4%

591.99

4.237

3.0%

30.7%

a
b
c

Customers below the poverty line.
Customers up to 50% above the poverty line.
Customers more than 50% above the poverty line.

directors wanted to place some indicators on the Balance Score Card to
be able to monitor bank's social actions.
4. Future challenges
In December 2004, the investment period for several shareholders
ended. The shares of ACCION investment, Mi Banco del Peru, a group
of Argentinean investors and member of BancoSol management
acquired more shares. The year 2005 brought major challenges for
BancoSol. “We have to understand the setting where BancoSol operates
and adapt to its changes. For example, the microﬁnance industry is an
industry that grows in period of crisis. Several opportunities appeared
before us to increase market share, we can grow in the rural area or in
the SME segment, or ﬁnd a way to provide to Bolivian emigrants
abroad,” the President of the Board of Directors reﬂected.
Kurt and his team had to come up with a strategy for the next three
years for the next Board of Directors' meeting. How can you achieve leadership in the microﬁnance segment when competition is more aggressive? How do you grow while maintaining your mission to serve the
low-income sectors with huge social impact and at the same time continue to be proﬁtable? There were the main questions they had to answer.
Appendix 1. BancoSol S.A. The recovery strategy, 2000–2004. High
reliability organizations analysis.
Since its creation in 1992, BancoSol was ranked as the number one institution in the microﬁnance market in Bolivia, growing rapidly during
the period 1992–1997. In the late 90s, high supply of microﬁnance services led to indebtedness of many micro and small entrepreneurs. Additionally, the country entered an economic crisis in 1998. Given the
instability of their income, many micro and small entrepreneurs were
unable to pay its debts. During 1999 and 2000 BancoSol performance deteriorated and the Board of Directors felt that the Bank was in crisis.
BancoSol then showed three characteristics of the High Reliability
Organizations (HRO) (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999): Commitment
to resilience, deference to expertise and preoccupation with failure.
In late 2000, the Bank began its transformation with a strategic planning process. During the formulation and implementation of its recovery strategy (2000–2004), BancoSol developed one of the principles of
the HRO, commitment to resilience. The Board of Directors and top
management analyzed and faced their mistakes and learned from
them. The commitment to resilience was evident from the very top of
the organization. The strategic changes are more effective if they are
in these guided and are committed to the highest hierarchical levels
(Golden & Zajac, 2001). The Board of Directors, aware of the challenges,
decided to invite and appoint as its President an outside person with extensive experience in the microﬁnance area. The Board also deﬁned a
new mission that would guide the institution in the process of change.
These actions have theoretical and empirical support in the literature
of strategy. More diversity on boards is associated with a greater likelihood of strategic change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). In

addition, there is evidence in the literature that more power given to a
person outside the organization is related to the magnitude of strategic
change (Gibbs, 1993). The new management made major changes in all
the main areas: credit, information systems, marketing, and human resources. In the marketing area, they realized that the bank was not fully
using its license focusing on a couple of loan products and no longer
responding to customer demand and the economic environment of
the country. The management decided to open its product portfolio
from two to seven products credit and add several non-credit ﬁnancial
services such as remittances and transfers. In the area of credit they
proceeded to change credit policies and gave more autonomy to agency
managers. This is another feature of the HRO, deference to expertise.
Since the branch managers knew more about the features and opportunities of microﬁnance institutions in their regions, they were able to
make reasonably credit decisions. Senior management delegated agency managers the approval of loans for amounts up to $6000. In the area
of information systems the bank proceeded to centralize IT processes
and provide to credit advisors equipment and the latest generation software for better decision-making. During this period, the Bank demonstrated its ability to adapt and recover to position itself as the best
institution in the Bolivian ﬁnancial system in 2004.
The recovery process led BancoSol to develop another principle of
the HRO, preoccupation with failure. In late 2004, the General Manager
of BancoSol and his team analyzed and developed the Bank's new strategy for the coming years. This time was no longer a reactive process,
they wanted to anticipate problems. The top management was cautious
with their success and wanted to be prepared to face the changes in the
environment looking for opportunities for improvement.
Appendix 2
BancoSol S.A.
The recovery strategy, 2000–2004
Teaching note
Authors: Luis Noel Alfaro, Karina Caballero, Mauricio Melgarejo,
Enrique Ogliastri
2.1. Case study overview
BancoSol was established as the ﬁrst Latin American bank specializing
in serving micro-entrepreneurs. Since its onset in La Paz, Bolivia, in 1992
it had achieved excellent results, becoming an international microcredit
benchmark. However, by mid-2000 its performance declined due to external and internal factors. As a result, BancoSol's management team
launched a strategy leading BancoSol to be rated as the best bank in the
Bolivian ﬁnancial system in 2004. This strategy relied mainly on developing new products and services, improving portfolio quality, optimizing
and standardizing operations, and achieving cost efﬁciency.
In 2005 BancoSol had several opportunities to enlarge its market
share by growing either in rural areas or in the SMEs sector or by ﬁnding
ways to extend credit to Bolivian migrants at their destinations.
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a. What were the main causes leading to a decline in performance in
both the microﬁnance industry and at BancoSol S.A.?
b. Why did the new strategy succeed? Can competitors replicate/emulate BancoSol strategy?
c. What course of action must BancoSol take to keep growing?
d. Are BancoSol's CSR measures adequate to evaluate corporate social
responsibility?
What indicators must be added to the Balanced Scorecard to properly monitor BancoSol's social performance?
e. What was the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy on its performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion?

In the early 90s BancoSol was the only regulated bank in the
microﬁnance industry. Then the Private Financial Funds Act (Ley de
Fondos Financieros Privados, FFPs) went into effect, resulting in lower
barriers to entry in the industry, increased supply of microﬁnance
services, more competition, and lower interest rates (via market, not decree). Then Chilean suppliers of consumer credit entered the market
and targeted the clients of microﬁnance institutions, leading to overindebtedness of clients and a decline in debt collection. In this context
some institutions began using “harsh collection techniques” which resulted, among other things, in the emergence of debtor associations.
As a result of the arrival of new competitors offering consumer credit, customers' tastes and preferences changed from solidarity groups to
individual loans.
Question # 2: Why did the new strategy succeed? (30 min)
BancoSol's initial strategy was implicit rather than formal. Since it
was the ﬁrst microﬁnance institution regulated in Latin America,
growth in the early years was easier, since there was little competition.
Process ﬂexibility and informal culture allowed BancoSol to provide
customized, agile loans to customers. However, a combination of crisis
and economic uncertainty, increased competition, and BancoSol's own
growth made it necessary to develop a new strategy.
Key competitive elements in BancoSol's strategy included,

2.4. Case study analysis (80 min)

1. Adjusting BancoSol's mission and vision.

Question # 1: What were the main causes leading to a decline in performance in both the microﬁnance industry and at BancoSol S.A.?
(10 min)

2.
3.
4.
5.

2.2. Teaching objectives
a. Analyzing the effect on BancoSol's strategy resulting from changes in
customer preferences and the external environment.
b. Assessing how BancoSol measures the social impact of its activities.
c. Assessing the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy on its performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion.
2.3. Guiding questions

Diversifying products and customizing product portfolio.
Diversiﬁcation market segment.
Improving operational procedures.
Changing image and positioning BancoSol.

What? Products and Services
Solidarity Loans, Individual Loans, Savings Account, Time Deposits

How?

-

-

Trust-based group
loan technology.
Descentralized
information
systems.
Regional operating
processes.
Informal culture
Staff with social
experience.
Direct marketing
aimed tocustomers
Functional structure

Mission
We are a leading, solvent,
efficient, profitable bank
supporting micro-entrepreneur
and small-business
development since 1992,
providingsimple, quick access
to comprehensive, high-quality
financial services. Our
corporate culture is open to
change, based on people, and
focused on customers,
encouraging career

Whom?

Microproducers

Where?

La Paz
El Alto
Cochabamba
Fig. 1. BancoSol — strategic diamond diagram 1992–2000.

Please cite this article as: Caballero, K., et al., Banco Solidario S.A.: The recovery strategy, 2000–2004, Journal of Business Research (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.03.010

12

K. Caballero et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

What? Products and Services
Solidarity loans

Savings Account

Individual loans

Time deposits

Sol Vivienda

Debit card

Sol Efectivo
Sol Vehículo
Sol de Oro
Solicita

How?

- Standard solidarity

-

and individual credit
technology.
Centralized
information systems.
Operational process
standardization.
Strategic culture.
Staff with banking
experience.
Media marketing.
Performance-based
incentives.
Continuous HR
training.
Functional structure

Mission
We are the bank offering lowerincome groups the opportunity
for a better future through
access to comprehensive, highquality financial services.
Vision
Being the leader, innovator,
and benchmark for local and
international microfinance by
promoting development,
progress, and quality of life for
lower-income individuals

Whom?

Microproducers
Microtraders
Microcredit for
housing
Employees

Where?
La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Sucre, Tarija

6. Using differentiation strategies as key development approach.
7. Developing staff.
BancoSol's new strategy was successful as all ﬁve elements in the
Strategic Diamond (Alfaro, 2003) were consistent with each other and
with changes in the environment (change in customers' preference
from solidarity groups to individual loans), enabling BancoSol to offer
a wide range of products and services through more productive, efﬁcient, agile processes. These changes helped BancoSol increase its return
on equity from 3.95% in 2000 to 20.9% in 2004. Figs. 1 and 2 display the
Strategic Diamonds before 2004 and after 2005.
Question # 3: Can competitors replicate/emulate BancoSol strategy?
(5 min)
Banking products are intangible and easy to emulate so product diversiﬁcation was not the core of BancoSol strategy. Rather, its centerpiece
was changes to internal factors (human resources, information systems,
process automation and standardization, funding structure, and so on)
which allowed BancoSol to attain higher ROE than its main competitors.
Even though this strategy can be effective in the short term, in the
medium term it can be emulated by rivals, so BancoSol only had just a
ﬁrst mover advantage. However, a beneﬁt BancoSol highlighted was
the fact that its bank license allowed it to engage in non-lending
operations that its FFP-licensed competitors could not perform. This

advantage was not sustainable, though, as Caja los Andes became a
licensed bank in January 2005.
To maintain its competitive edge BancoSol had to continually improve, reﬁne, and innovate operations, and stay open to new changes
in resource management. It needed to avoid stagnation, analyze changes in both the market and its own environment, and remain sensitive in
order to respond to changes by adapting its own structure.
Question # 4: What course of action must BancoSol take to keep
growing? (5 min)
Evidence from the case indicates that most of the growth in the
microﬁnance market was taking place in rural areas and loans to small
and medium-sized entrepreneurs. Since BancoSol had no presence
in these segments, there were growth opportunities to be pursued there.
2.4.1. Advantages fostering BancoSol's growth in SMEs and the rural sector
- Rural areas not yet fully served by ﬁnancial organizations. Wide
range of BancoSol products and services.
- Good local image. Strong capital structure. Highly-qualiﬁed staff.

2.4.2. Disadvantages hindering BancoSol's growth in the rural sector
- Lack of coverage in intermediate cities and the rural sector. No loan
technology developed for SMEs and rural microcredit. PRODEM
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Table 1
Financial inclusion: BancoSol — 1999–2004 performance indicators.
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

82.30
73,073
0.9%
54.80
32,748
0.4%
64.6%
105,821
1.3%
1.70
6.9%

77.40
67,082
0.8%
54.90
30,004
0.4%
71.3%
97,086
1.1%
1.40
5.4%

81.10
61,338
0.7%
61.00
43,698
0.5%
79.7%
105,036
1.2%
2.30
11.0%

80.90
50,904
0.6%
61.90
48,341
0.5%
73.9%
99,245
1.1%
1.60
8.1%

91.20
42,831
0.5%
69.70
N.A.
N.A.
71.6%
N.A.
N.A.
2.10
10.0%

108.60
71,609
0.8%
81.50
N.A.
N.A.
68.1%
N.A.
N.A.
2.60
10.0%

1126.09
74.0%
1673

1154.56
63.0%
1830

1212.8
60.0%
1396

1487.7
68.6%
1280

2126.01
54.9%
N.A.

1517.89
49.7%
N.A.

Convenience indicator
Number of points of service

43

37

35

34

36

34

Quality indicators
Growth of loan portfolio
Growth of deposit portfolio
Effective lending rate
Effective deposit rate
PAR N30 days
Loss rate from bad debt
Overhead (operating expenses/loan portfolio)

11.1%
1.1%
28.4%
8.6%
5.9%
0.0%
16.3%

−5.9%
0.2%
30.6%
10.3%
9.6%
0.0%
15.2%

−4.0%
11.1%
25.6%
8.5%
12.7%
10.6%
14.0%

1.8%
1.5%
24.4%
6.3%
8.2%
0.0%
12.7%

20.2%
12.6%
21.1%
6.0%
5.9%
2.3%
13.4%

19.4%
16.9%
21.1%
6.2%
3.7%
1.2%
12.5%

1.26
1.4%
9.0%

1.25
0.6%
3.9%

1.25
0.1%
0.4%

1.36
0.3%
1.8%

1.25
1.9%
13.2%

1.28
3.1%
22.2%

Extent of outreach indicators
Volume of loan portfolio (US $ M)
Number of borrowers
% of population with access to BancoSol loans
Volume of deposit portfolio (US $ M)
Number of depositors
% of population with access to BancoSol S.A. savings accounts
Share of the deposit portfolio in total liabilities
Total of active/passive customers
% of population with access to savings and loan service
Income from other services (US $ M)
Income from other services/total income.
Depth of outreach indicators
Average loan size
Percentage of women among total borrowers
Average size of deposits (US $)

Permanence indicators: sustainability of ﬁnancial inclusion
Sustainability Index (SI) = income/expense
Return on assets (ROA) = proﬁts/assets
Return on equity (ROE) = proﬁts/equity

Source: Microﬁnance Information Exchange, Inc. [online] http://www.mixmarket.org/mﬁ/bancosol/report. Accessed November 2013.
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Table 2
Banco Solidario — BancoSol 2005–2012 performance indicators.

Outreach indicators
Volume of loan portfolio (US $ M)
Number of borrowers
% of population with access to BancoSol loans
Volume of deposit portfolio (US $ M)
Number of depositors
% of population with access to BancoSol S.A. savings account
Share of deposit portfolio in total liabilities
Total of active/passive customers.
% of population with access to savings and loan service
Income from other services (US $ M)
Income from other services/total income.

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

130.10
85,000
0.9%
97.40
76,587
0.8%
62.6%
161,587
1.7%
2.50
8.7%

163.10
103,786
1.1%
146.10
111,946
1.2%
72.4%
215,732
2.3%
3.70
10.2%

209.00
121,207
1.3%
169.50
169,507
1.8%
71.1%
290,714
3.0%
5.10
11.7%

294.20
109,763
1.1%
261.70
209,845
2.1%
74.1%
319,608
3.2%
2.60
4.5%

351.80
129,705
1.3%
342.90
323,022
3.2%
76.8%
452,727
4.5%
2.70
3.7%

439.80
145,608
1.4%
420.10
414,154
4.1%
77.5%
559,762
5.5%
1.40
1.7%

585.60
169,251
1.6%
536.20
484,973
4.7%
80.3%
654,224
6.3%
2.70
2.6%

733.00
193,208
1.8%
634.30
547,222
5.2%
77.2%
740,430
7.1%
1.60
1.3%

3020.68
48.1%
1014

3459.66
48.1%
1106

3793.64
47.5%
1159

Penetration indicators
Average loan size
1530.66
1571.76
1723.99
2680.46
2712.5
Percentage of women among total borrowers
48.4%
46.4%
46.4%
47.2%
48.0%
Average size of deposits
1272
1305
1000
1247
1061
Source: Microﬁnance Information Exchange, Inc. [online] http://www.mixmarket.org/mﬁ/bancosol/report. Accessed November 2013
Convenience indicator
Number of points of service

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

59

53

69

70

81

Quality indicators
Growth of loan portfolio
Growth of deposit portfolio
Effective lending rate
Effective deposit rate
Portfolio at risk N30 days
Loss rate from bad debt
Overhead (operating expenses/loan portfolio)

19.7%
19.6%
20.1%
5.8%
3.9%
0.4%
11.7%

25.4%
49.9%
19.7%
4.8%
3.7%
0.2%
11.7%

28.1%
16.0%
18.6%
5.6%
1.0%
2.2%
11.1%

40.8%
54.4%
18.6%
5.1%
1.0%
1.2%
11.2%

19.6%
31.0%
19.5%
5.1%
1.1%
0.5%
9.9%

25.0%
22.5%
18.1%
3.3%
0.9%
0.6%
10.2%

33.1%
27.7%
16.8%
2.8%
0.8%
0.3%
10.5%

25.2%
18.3%
17.1%
3.0%
0.7%
0.4%
10.6%

Permanence indicators
Sustainability Index (SI) = Income/Expense.
Return on assets (ROA) = Proﬁts/Assets.
Return on equity (ROE) = Proﬁts/Equity.

1.24
2.7%
22.2%

1.33
2.3%
22.8%

1.29
3.0%
31.6%

1.22
0.7%
8.1%

1.32
2.6%
33.9%

1.40
2.2%
30.1%

1.40
2.3%
30.3%

1.36
2.1%
28.8%

Source: Luis Noel Alfaro (2003) based on Microﬁnance Information Exchange, Inc. [online] http://www.mixmarket.org/mﬁ/bancosol/report. Accessed November 2013.

leadership in the rural sector. Growing competition in the
microﬁnance sector.

Some new responsibility indicators that may be added to BancoSol
Balance Score Card in various categories include,

Question # 5: Are BancoSol's CSR measures adequate to evaluate
corporate social responsibility? What indicators must be added to the
Balanced Scorecard to properly monitor BancoSol's social performance?
(15 min).
The CSR Hexagon model (Ogliastri, 2003; Ogliastri et al., 2009) will
be used to evaluate BancoSol social responsibility.
BancoSol's measurements of its performance in terms of social responsibility include only a few categories, that is, customers, employees, and income distribution among publics of interest (see
Table 3).
In addition to pointing to BancoSol's economic performance,
some indicators in the Balance Score Card can also indicate
BancoSol's social responsibility. For example, the Cash/Public Liabilities indicator measures BancoSol's responsibility to maintain optimum levels of liquidity allowing it to respond to its depositors in
case of crisis.
As a part of BancoSol's current measures of social responsibility, the
following items can be added to its Balance Score Card (BSC):

• Suppliers: (a) percentage of suppliers engaged in social responsibility
practices, (b) supplier satisfaction.
• Environment: number of environmental projects implemented
(e.g., energy savings and paper savings).
• Customers: percentage of customer complaints solved.
• Transparence, values, and anti-corruption practices: (a) number of
audits per year and/or audit hours per year, (b) number of employees
trained in asset laundering.

• Customers: (a) percentage of poor customers (level 1), (b) percentage
of new poor customers, and (c) percentage of customers who
succeeded in improving their revenues.
• Suppliers: percentage of Bank revenue distributed to suppliers.
• Community: percentage of Bank revenues devoted to donations to the
community.
• Employees: (a) average training hours per employee, (b) number of
employees with degrees/number of employees (these indicators are
already included in the BSC).
• Organizational Strengthening: percentage of Bank revenues devoted
to tax payments.

Question # 6: What was the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy
on its performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion? (10 min, including
closing).
As a development ﬁnance institution, ﬁnancial inclusion is a crucial
issue at BancoSol S.A. We will use the conceptual framework known
as the Star of Financial Inclusion, developed by Prof. Luis Noel Alfaro,
to assess the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy on BancoSol's performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion.
First we can see that BancoSol S.A. is explicitly committed to ﬁnancial inclusion; its mission clearly states the Bank's purpose to
provide lower-income segments of society with access to ﬁnancial
services.
The data in Table 1 of this note can be used to evaluate the effect of
strategic changes in BancoSol on its performance in terms of ﬁnancial
inclusion. Table 2 shows signiﬁcant improvement of BancoSol's performance from 1999 to 2012 in every dimension of the Star of Financial Inclusion except for depth of ﬁnancial inclusion; BancoSol lost depth as a
result of implementing an upscaling process by moving to cater to small
and medium-sized enterprises in addition to microenterprises.

Please cite this article as: Caballero, K., et al., Banco Solidario S.A.: The recovery strategy, 2000–2004, Journal of Business Research (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.03.010

K. Caballero et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx

2.5. Conclusion
According to information until 2012, BancoSol had really impressive
performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion in the following dimensions
of the Star of Financial Inclusion: Extent of Outreach, Depth of Outreach,
Geographic Convenience, Quality of Outreach and Permanence and Sustainability of Financial Inclusion. BancoSol S.A. received in 2008 the
Award of Excellence from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) as the best regulated microﬁnance institution in Latin America.
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